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Untangling Tinker and Defining the Scope 
of the Heckler’s Veto Doctrine’s 
Protection of Students’ Free Speech Rights 
Tryphena Liu 
In the last thirty years, courts have steadily chipped away at the 
protections afforded student free speech on K-12 campuses by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District. In Tinker, the Court held that schools 
may not restrict students’ right to speak unless the speech causes, or 
threatens to cause, a substantial disruption or infringes on the rights of 
other students. This Note argues that the diminishing force of Tinker’s 
protection of student free speech is largely the result of the difficulty of 
applying Tinker’s ostensibly straightforward holding, and of 
establishing the appropriate balance between maintaining a safe and 
effective learning environment and protecting students’ First Amendment 
rights. This Note proposes revisiting the heckler’s veto doctrine, which 
prohibits the government from restricting speech solely based on the 
disruptive or violent reaction of the listeners or onlookers (i.e., hecklers), 
as a way to push back against the increasing encroachment on students’ 
First Amendment rights. Although the Court articulated the principles 
of the heckler’s veto doctrine in Tinker, subsequent courts have failed to 
clearly identify the implications of the doctrine on the Tinker analysis, 
thus further weakening Tinker’s protection of student free speech. This 
Note argues that future courts deciding student free speech questions 
must explicitly address the heckler’s veto doctrine to prevent hecklers 
from contributing to the infringement on students’ constitutional right to 
both speak and hear. The Note concludes by suggesting a possible 
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The evolution of the doctrine espoused in the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, decided in 1969, has 
weakened students’ free speech rights on K-12 campuses. One manifestation of this 
evolution is increasing disregard for the heckler’s veto doctrine. A heckler’s veto 
occurs when the government restricts speech solely based on the disruptive or 
violent reaction of the listeners or onlookers.1 The heckler’s veto doctrine holds 
that such action is unconstitutional.2 Despite the many court decisions upholding 
bans on student expression that have led to the conclusion that Tinker is a principle 
with no bite, courts have long relied on Tinker for the notion that students do not 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”3 The majority in Tinker was concerned about preventing state-
operated schools from becoming “enclaves of totalitarianism,” where students may 
only express state-sanctioned ideas.4 The Court noted that the protection of 
constitutional rights in schools is especially important because schools are where 
the nation’s young citizens learn the values of democracy.5 The Court relied on 
Justice Brennan’s articulation of this principle in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of 
University of State of New York: 
“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital 
than in the community of American schools.” The classroom is peculiarly 
 
1. See Nicole A. Maruzzi, Case Comment, Constitutional Law – First Amendment Gives Way to 
a Heckler’s Veto – Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014), 48 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 991, 993–94 (2015). 
2. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform,  
Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 787–88 (9th Cir. 2008). 
3. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
4. Id. at 511. 
5. See id. at 507. 
Final to Printer_Liu (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2019  9:34 AM 
2019] UNTANGLING TINKER 831 
the “marketplace of ideas.” The Nation’s future depends upon leaders 
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which 
discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any 
kind of authoritative selection.”6 
Nevertheless, the Court also acknowledged the deference given to school 
officials to control conduct in schools.7 In order to balance these two interests, the 
Court held that where students’ First Amendment freedom of expression rights are 
at stake, the school “must be able to show that its action [to restrict student speech] 
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”8 Instead, the 
school must demonstrate that school officials had reason to anticipate that the 
banned speech would “substantially interfere with the work of the school or 
impinge upon the rights of other students.”9 
Applying these principles to the facts of Tinker, the Court found there was no 
reasonable basis to support the school officials’ prediction that the wearing of black 
armbands to protest the hostilities in Vietnam would cause substantial disruption 
or a material interference with school activity.10 Additionally, the school failed to 
demonstrate that the wearing of the armbands actually disrupted the work of the 
school or any class because there were no threats or acts of violence on school 
premises—only a few students had made hostile remarks to the students wearing 
armbands.11 The Court thus concluded that the prohibition of the wearing of the 
armbands to school violated students’ First Amendment rights.12 
Scholars have noted that since the Supreme Court decided Tinker, lower courts 
and the Supreme Court itself have problematically retreated from the opinion’s 
original protections.13 Indeed, Tinker’s ostensibly easy conclusion is undercut by 
subsequent applications of the “substantial disruption” test and the second prong 
of the Tinker test: whether the challenged speech “impinge[s] upon the rights of 
other students.”14 For example, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, decided in 
1986, the Supreme Court found that schools may proscribe speech that is “vulgar 
and lewd” or “plainly offensive” without a showing of a threat of substantial 
disruption.15 In balancing the free speech rights of students and the discretion of 
school officials to control conduct in school, the Court weighed more in favor of 
 
6. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
7. See id. at 507. 
8. Id. at 509. 
9. Id. 
10. See id. at 514. 
11. See id. at 508. 
12. See id. 
13. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse 
Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 528 (2000); Lucinda Housley Luetkemeyer, 
Silencing the Rebel Yell: The Eighth Circuit Upholds a Public School’s Ban on Confederate Flags, 75  
MO. L. REV. 989, 995 (2010). 
14. Tinker, 337 U.S. at 509. 
15. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–85 (1986). 
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the latter, emphasizing the importance of preserving the school’s basic educational 
mission of advancing “the appropriate form of civil discourse and political 
expression.”16 Even in lower court decisions that focused on the safety of the 
students, courts expanded Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test to say that 
restriction of free speech may be permissible even when the mode of expression at 
issue has never caused or contributed to any prior disruptions.17 
Another factor that has contributed to the diminishing protection of students’ 
free speech rights is an issue with the Tinker decision itself. Although the Supreme 
Court articulated the principles of the heckler’s veto doctrine in Tinker, it did not 
have an opportunity to address how the doctrine would apply in practice. 
Specifically, the Court failed to consider the implications of the “substantial 
disruption” test on the concerns the heckler’s veto doctrine sought to combat. In 
effect, the “substantial disruption” test and the heckler’s veto doctrine are 
inconsistent with each other. In addition, because the Court likely came to its 
findings in Tinker based on the assumption that the school was the only silencing 
agent, it inadvertently created a road map for ways in which other students could 
bypass the heckler’s veto doctrine and silence the speaker. For example, under the 
“substantial disruption” test, students can cause the school to silence the speaker 
merely by threatening substantial disruption. 
Students’ right to speak is enshrined in but also limited by doctrine. Students 
have the right to speak unrestricted by the school if the speech does not cause, or 
threaten to cause, a substantial disruption, or infringe on the rights of other 
students.18 However, this basic formulation of the Tinker test, which was perhaps 
once clear, has now become muddled as courts grapple with finding the proper 
balance between preserving schools as the marketplace of ideas and ensuring 
schools are able to advance their educational goals, which include both protecting 
students and maintaining classroom decorum. More often than not, courts decide 
to silence speakers, finding that the latter interest outweighs students’ free speech 
rights.19 Furthermore, sophisticated opponents of speakers recognize that they can 
turn these tests to their advantage, a move that implicates the heckler’s veto 
doctrine. 
Part I of this Note discusses three different frameworks courts have used to 
analyze restrictions on student free speech under Tinker: (A) Tinker’s “substantial 
disruption” test, (B) Fraser’s “plainly offensive” standard, and (C) the heckler’s veto 
doctrine. Part I demonstrates how the “substantial disruption” test and the plainly 
offensive standard, developed from Tinker’s “rights of other students” prong, fail 
to adequately protect speakers from being silenced by hecklers. Part I also points 
out that even decisions that have applied the heckler’s veto doctrine do not provide 
 
16. Id. 
17. See B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 2009); Luetkemeyer, 
supra note 13, at 1002. 
18. Tinker, 337 U.S. at 509. 
19. See Luetkemeyer, supra note 13, at 1002. 
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clear guidance on how schools can distinguish between hecklers who merely 
disagree with the speaker’s message and genuinely aggrieved listeners who are 
reasonably offended or harmed by the speech. Part II illustrates how lower courts’ 
application of the two prongs of the Tinker test—the “rights of other students” 
prong and the “substantial disruption” prong—chip away at the protections 
afforded by the heckler’s veto doctrine. Lastly, Part III argues that schools and 
courts are not appropriately balancing the rights of students because they not only 
privilege the rights of potential hecklers over those of speakers, but they also fail to 
take into account the constitutionally-protected right of students who are not 
opposed to the contested expression to hear the speaker. Part III concludes that it 
is especially important for analyses of students’ free speech rights on campus to 
explicitly address the heckler’s veto doctrine in order to prevent hecklers from 
infringing on the rights of students to both speak and hear. 
I. COMPLICATIONS WITH APPLICATION OF TINKER 
Student free speech rights decisions issued after Tinker use the “substantial 
disruption” prong and the “rights of other students” prong of the Tinker test to 
create exceptions to the free speech guarantees of Tinker. These exceptions 
undermine the heckler’s veto doctrine and make it easier for schools to silence 
students. Specifically, applications of Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test fail to 
consider the possibility that students may be tactically threatening or engaging in 
substantial disruption just to silence the speaker. As a result, the “substantial 
disruption” exception creates the possibility of schools silencing speakers based on 
the reactions of hecklers anytime the school can establish a threat of substantial 
disruption. Fraser’s “plainly offensive” standard also facilitates schools’ ability to 
silence speakers by allowing schools and courts to impose their own judgment about 
the effects of speech on students to justify a ban on the speech. This Part concludes 
by noting that the protections supposedly afforded by the heckler’s veto doctrine 
do little to combat the effect of these exceptions. Not only are applications of the 
heckler’s veto doctrine inconsistent with each other, but they also leave many 
questions unanswered. 
A. Tinker’s “Substantial Disruption” Test 
Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test is inherently in tension with the heckler’s 
veto doctrine because it allows schools to silence speakers based on the actual or 
feared reaction of other students if the reaction rises to the level of substantial 
disruption. This tension is evident in appellate courts’ application of the “substantial 
disruption” test to cases deciding the constitutionality of prohibitions of the display 
of the Confederate flag.20 The majority of these cases have found that a history of 
 
20. See Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 432 (4th Cir. 2013); Defoe ex  
rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 2010); B.W.A., 554 F.3d at 740–41; Barr v. Lafon, 538 
F.3d 554, 567 (6th Cir. 2008); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th 
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racial tension made the school’s prediction of substantial disruption reasonable.21 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned, “Racial tension can devolve to violence suddenly. 
Schools may act proactively to prohibit race-related violence or even excessive racial 
tension that forces unnecessary departures of minority students from the school.”22 
Similarly, in Defoe v. Spiva, the Sixth Circuit concluded that even if the display of the 
Confederate flag does not actually disrupt the learning environment, a school could 
still reasonably forecast that displays of the flag would likely contribute to disruption 
in the future due to the “incendiary atmosphere then existing.”23 Based on the facts 
of Defoe, the court found it was not unconstitutional for the school to prohibit 
students from wearing T-shirts displaying the Confederate flag to campus because 
the “racial violence, tension, and threats occurring in Anderson County schools as 
well as the fact that the Confederate flag is a ‘controversial racial and political 
symbol’” supported the school officials’ conclusion that displays of the Confederate 
flag would result in substantial disruption of the school environment.24 
These cases indicate that a school may ban certain student expression as long 
as the school officials can point to instances in which the mode of expression at 
issue has caused disruptions in the past. This seemingly straightforward analysis 
becomes complicated when determining whether the seriousness or the number of 
past disruptions matters. It also raises the question of whether these courts were 
easily able to find bans on the display of the Confederate flag constitutional because 
the Confederate flag is an unquestionably divisive symbol. For example, it is less 
clear whether a case concerning a ban on the display of the American flag in a 
specific context would be as readily held constitutional, especially when the display 
does not cause a substantial disruption.25 More importantly, this analysis does not 
account for the heckler’s veto problem. Because there is no disagreement that the 
Confederate flag is a controversial symbol, the schools and the courts did not have 
to consider the possibility that students were tactically attempting to silence the 
speaker. Thus, cases dealing with incontestably controversial symbols do not fully 
address the tension between Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test and the heckler’s 
veto doctrine, and consequently fail to provide any guidance on how to assess 
whether a disruption in response to a student’s expression is tactical or genuine. 
B. Fraser’s “Plainly Offensive” Standard 
As mentioned, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to Tinker’s 
“substantial disruption” test by finding prohibitions of “plainly offensive” 
 
Cir. 2000); Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 1335 (6th Cir. 1972); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 598 
(6th Cir. 1970). 
21. Supra note 20.  
22. B.W.A., 554 F.3d at 741. 
23. Defoe, 625 F.3d at 335 (quoting D.B. ex rel. Brogdon v. Lafon, 217 F. App’x 518, 523 (6th 
Cir. 2007)). 
24. Id. at 336 (quoting Castorina v. Madison Cty. Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 542 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
25. See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 779 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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expression, such as lewd and vulgar speech, constitutional in Fraser.26 In so finding, 
the Court underscored the context of the school, where the sensibility of minors is 
at stake: “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”27 The Court noted, “This 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the 
otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where 
the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include children.”28 The Court 
focused on the need to prevent minors from both being exposed to and 
perpetuating speech that conflicts with the standards of decency of a democratic 
society.29 The Court stated that “schools must teach by example the shared values 
of a civilized social order.”30 Consequently, in Fraser, the Court found it permissible 
for the school to restrict a student’s free speech rights where, during a speech 
nominating a classmate for student office, the student referred to his candidate in 
terms of an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”31 The Court 
indicated that unlike the passive expression of a political viewpoint in Tinker, the 
sexual content of the speech in the present case intruded upon the work of the 
school and the rights of the other students.32 Specifically, the Court stated that “[b]y 
glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting 
to teenage girl students.”33 
In Nixon v. Local School District Board of Education, an Ohio district court 
interpreted Fraser’s holding to mean that the “plainly offensive” standard only 
applies to speech that is offensive “because of the manner in which it is conveyed.”34 
The court stated that some examples of such expression include speech containing 
“vulgar language, graphic sexual innuendos, or speech that promotes suicide, drugs, 
alcohol, or murder.”35 The court distinguished this expression from speech that 
conveys a potentially offensive political viewpoint.36 In Nixon, a student wore a  
T-shirt to school that contained the following statements: “Homosexuality is a  
sin! Islam is a lie! Abortion is murder!”37 Having established the distinction between 
the types of speech regulated by Fraser and those by Tinker, the court concluded, 
“Clearly, [the student’s] shirt is not plainly offensive based on the manner in which 
its message is conveyed. Rather, any offensive characteristics of [the student’s] shirt 
stem from the views espoused thereon, thus rendering it necessary to analyze this 
 
26. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–85 (1986). 
27. Id. at 682. 
28. Id. 
29. See id. at 681–84. 
30. Id. at 683. 
31. Id. at 678. 
32. Id. at 680. 
33. Id. at 683. 
34. Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
35. Id. 
36. See id. 
37. Id. at 967. 
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case under Tinker.”38 The court then applied Tinker’s substantial disruption test. 
However, as discussed more in Part II, this attempt to distinguish between  
“plainly offensive” speech and speech that conveys a potentially offensive political 
viewpoint is largely futile, especially because the Ninth Circuit has opened the door 
to upholding restrictions on speech where “the views espoused thereon” are 
directed at students of a certain minority status.39 Therefore, Fraser not only 
undercuts Tinker’s protection of students’ free speech rights, but it also pulls Tinker 
even further away from the heckler’s veto doctrine by lowering the bar for both the 
school and the student to silence the speaker. 
C. The Heckler’s Veto Doctrine 
In theory, the heckler’s veto doctrine places limits on schools’ discretion in 
determining what types of speech are proscribable. The Supreme Court articulated 
this doctrine in its decision in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, where it reversed a 
conviction that was based on a city ordinance prohibiting speech which “stir[red] 
the public to anger, invite[d] dispute, [brought] about a condition of unrest, or 
create[d] a disturbance.”40 The Court stated that none of these grounds may be the 
basis for a conviction.41 The Court further explained this holding in its opinion in 
Street v. New York, where it found it unconstitutional to criminally convict an 
individual for standing across the street from a burning American flag and stating 
to a crowd of people: “We don’t need no damn flag.”42 The Court reasoned that 
such a conviction could not be justified by “the possible tendency of appellant’s 
words to provoke violent retaliation”43 or sustained on the ground that “appellant’s 
words were likely to shock passers-by.”44 It explained that “any shock effect of 
appellant’s speech must be attributed to the content of the ideas expressed”45 and 
that “[i]t is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas 
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some 
of their hearers.”46 The Court therefore concluded that the speaker could not be 
silenced based on the effect of his words on listeners, demonstrating a great concern 
for protecting the right to freedom of expression. However, the Court has noted an 
exception to the heckler’s veto doctrine for “fighting words.” In Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, the Court stated: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, 
 
38. Id. 
39. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). 
40. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949). 
41. See id. at 5. 
42. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590–91 (1969). 
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the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words – those which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace.47 
This exception makes the heckler’s veto doctrine a challenge to apply because 
it is difficult to distinguish between “fighting words” that “by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”48 and speech that 
merely “stirs the public to anger” or “creates a disturbance.”49 
If it is difficult to determine when the heckler’s veto doctrine applies in First 
Amendment cases in general, its invocation in school settings is likely arbitrary, 
especially with the added consideration of the protection of minors from harmful 
speech.50 At first glance, Tinker appears to be a paradigmatic articulation of the 
doctrine. This is evidenced by the fact that in Tinker, the Supreme Court cites to its 
decision in Terminiello for the notion that the right to freedom of expression must 
be protected despite the risk of disturbance, stating: 
[ I ]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is 
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure 
from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the 
majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the 
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another 
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution 
says we must take this risk . . . .51 
Consequently, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Tinker as 
an application of the doctrine to free speech regulation in schools.52 These courts 
have relied on the doctrine to say that unless the speaker’s speech constitutes 
“fighting words,” it is impermissible to use threats of violence or disruption by 
hecklers to silence a speaker.53 The Seventh Circuit stated: 
Statements that while not fighting words are met by violence or threats or 
other unprivileged retaliatory conduct by persons offended by them cannot 
lawfully be suppressed because of that conduct. Otherwise free speech 
could be stifled by the speaker’s opponent’s mounting a riot, even though, 
because the speech had contained no fighting words, no reasonable person 
would have been moved to a riotous response.54 
Applying this principle in Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School District, the Seventh 
Circuit found that a school unconstitutionally restricted students’ free speech when 
it banned the display of the slogan, “Be Happy, Not Gay,” as a violation of a school 
 
47. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
48. Id. at 572. 
49. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949). 
50. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
51. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969). 
52. See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004). 
53. See Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 879; Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1275–76. 
54. Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 879. 
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rule forbidding “‘derogatory comments’ spoken or written, ‘that refer to race, 
ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disability.’”55 The court stated that 
because “Be Happy, Not Gay” did not constitute fighting words, the school could 
not ban the speech based on the fact that other students had harassed the speaker 
because of their disapproval of her message.56 The court explained that such a ban 
would violate the heckler’s veto doctrine.57 
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit alluded to the heckler’s veto doctrine in its 
decision in Holloman v. Harland, stating, “While the same constitutional standards 
do not always apply in public schools as on public streets, we cannot afford students 
less constitutional protection simply because their peers might illegally express 
disagreement through violence instead of reason.”58 However, the court also added 
the caveat that the protection only applies if the speech is not “so inherently 
inflammatory as to come within that small class of ‘fighting words’ which are ‘likely 
to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the 
peace.’”59 In Holloman, a school punished a student for refusing to recite the Pledge 
of Allegiance and silently raising his fist in the air during the class recitation of the 
pledge.60 The court found the school’s restriction of the student’s free speech 
unconstitutional because the student’s expression “was not directed ‘toward’ anyone 
or any group and could not be construed by a reasonable person . . . as a personal 
offense or insult.”61 In other words, the student’s speech did not constitute fighting 
words. 
Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the fighting words 
exception is actually consistent with the heckler’s veto doctrine. In Holloman, the 
court equates the use of fighting words with substantial disruption, focusing on the 
actions of the speaker rather than the response of the listeners. It concluded: 
Even if [the school was] correct in fearing that other students may react 
inappropriately or illegally, such reactions do not justify suppression of [the 
student’s] expression . . . because the record reveals no way in which he 
“materially and substantially interfere[d] with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”62 
Thus, if the speaker’s expression of fighting words does not cause a substantial 
disruption, then the school may not silence the speaker, regardless of whether the 
school reasonably predicted a threat of substantial disruption by listeners. Because 
the school can only ban speech based on the actions of the speaker under this 
principle, there is no risk of violating the heckler’s veto doctrine. This suggests that 
 
55. Id. at 875. 
56. See id. at 879. 
57. See id. 
58. Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1276. 
59. Id. (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 
60. See id. at 1261. 
61. Id. at 1275. 
62. Id. at 1276 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
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one way to determine whether the substantial disruption is tactical or genuine is by 
looking at the conduct of the speaker. If the speaker uses fighting words, then the 
school may assume that the protesting listeners are not hecklers because such words 
“by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace.”63 However, the court provides little guidance on how to determine when 
speech constitutes fighting words. On one end of the spectrum is raising a fist 
during the Pledge of Allegiance, on the other end is doing a Nazi salute, but what if 
the student had raised a middle finger during the pledge? In addition, as will be 
discussed more in Part II, courts have looked at whether the speech is targeted, 
denigrating members of specific groups, as a way to assess whether speech may be 
limited. However, this leads to Kellam Conover’s question in his article, Protecting 
the Children: When Can Schools Restrict Harmful Student Speech?: “Does the speech 
have to be individually targeted, or are broad political statements also 
proscribable?”64 As mentioned previously, in Nixon, the district court deemed 
speech conveying an offensive political viewpoint innocuous, but it is not hard to 
imagine situations in which such speech could be nonetheless considered inherently 
inflammatory. For instance, does a history of racial tension make an offensive 
political viewpoint inherently inflammatory? 
To add further to these complications, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
Zamecnik indicates that, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the 
“substantial disruption” test, there are certain circumstances in which the school 
may silence the speaker if the hostility incited by the speech threatens or causes 
substantial disruption, regardless of whether the speaker used fighting words.65 
Indeed, the court acknowledged that although Tinker endorsed the heckler’s veto 
doctrine, Tinker is “also the source of the ‘substantial disruption’ test of permissible 
school censorship.”66 Ultimately, the court concluded that the anger incited by the 
student’s display of the words “Be Happy, Not Gay” did not rise to the level of 
substantial disruption, and therefore, the school could not constitutionally proscribe 
such speech.67 Nevertheless, because the Seventh Circuit has indicated that there 
are situations in which the “substantial disruption” test can trump the heckler’s veto 
doctrine, even if the speech does not fall under the fighting words exception, the 
protections ostensibly guaranteed by the heckler’s veto doctrine are tenuous. In 
addition, several questions are left unanswered. For example, how do we distinguish 
between speech that is proscribable because it is “inherently inflammatory and not 
inherently provocative speech that schools cannot ban even though the speech may 
elicit a violent response from other students? When does a response become 
sufficiently disruptive to justify a ban on the speech? 
 
63. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
64. Kellam Conover, Protecting the Children: When Can Schools Restrict Harmful Student Speech?, 
26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 351 (2015). 
65. See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011). 
66. Id. 
67. See id. at 880. 
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II. A CASE STUDY OF THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF THE TINKER ANALYSIS 
On top of the already tenuous foundation of the heckler’s veto doctrine, 
subsequent applications of the Tinker analysis continue to undermine the 
protections of speech afforded by the doctrine. In fact, both prongs of the Tinker 
test, the “rights of other students” prong and the “substantial disruption” prong, 
provide an avenue for schools and courts to sidestep the doctrine. Specifically, the 
rights of others prong presents courts the opportunity to uphold prohibitions of 
speech based on their own judgment about what constitutes sufficiently offensive 
speech. At the same time, the “substantial disruption” prong allows hecklers to use 
the threat of substantial disruption to silence speech that would otherwise be 
protected. 
A. Tinker Test Prong One: Rights of Other Students 
Like Fraser’s plainly offensive standard and the Eleventh Circuit’s fighting 
words exception, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Harper v. Poway Unified School 
District avoids running into the heckler’s veto doctrine by determining that listeners 
are not merely hecklers if they are genuinely aggrieved by the challenged speech.68 
Consistent with the fighting words exception, which excludes offensive speech 
“directed ‘toward’ anyone or any group”69 from First Amendment protection, the 
court focused on the identity of the listeners and whether the speech singles out for 
denigration a particular, vulnerable group (regardless of whether the group is in the 
audience). This is problematic because the Ninth Circuit expands the definition of 
“plainly offensive” or “inherently inflammatory” speech using the “rights of other 
students” prong of the Tinker test. In Harper, a student wore a T-shirt to school 
reading “I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED.” on the 
front, and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL.” on the back.70 Focusing on 
the “rights of other students” analysis, the court found it permissible for schools to 
ban such speech, because speech targeted at students who are members of minority 
groups that have historically been oppressed “serves to injure and intimidate them, 
as well as to damage their sense of security and interfere with their opportunity to 
learn.”71 Interestingly, the court adds the caveat that its holding is limited to 
“instances of derogatory and injurious remarks directed at students’ minority status 
such as race, religion, and sexual orientation.”72 It grounds its reasoning in the 
principles Tinker espoused, emphasizing, “Engaging in controversial political 
speech, even when it is offensive to others, is an important right of all Americans 
and learning the value of such freedoms is an essential part of a public school 
education.”73 However, despite the court’s attempt to limit its holding, the court’s 
 
68. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). 
69. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004). 
70. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1171. 
71. Id. at 1178. 
72. Id. at 1183. 
73. Id. at 1182–83. 
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rationale is similar to that of the Supreme Court in Fraser, where the Court expanded 
the scope of proscribable speech by imposing its own judgment as to  
what constitutes impermissibly offensive speech. In her article, In Defense of the 
“Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial Student Speech, Abby Marie Mollen states that 
this violates Tinker because “it indirectly gives schools the power to suppress the 
expression of ideas they oppose by characterizing those ideas as harmful.”74 In fact, 
the reasoning in Harper gives schools even broader discretion to decide when 
student speech is proscribable because, in addition to speech deemed offensive by 
societal standards, certain types of speech may be deemed offensive based on the 
identity of the listener. 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Harper conflicts with the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Zamecnik, where the court indicated that a school could only 
justify a ban on speech if it presented empirical evidence of the harmful effects of 
the speech on the particular minority targeted.75 Such an objective standard would 
place limits on schools’ and courts’ ability to impose their own determination of 
offensive speech. This objective test would also resolve the Eleventh Circuit’s 
heckler’s veto doctrine concerns that students could silence a speaker by “[cloaking] 
their disagreement in the guise of offense or disgust.”76 However, the Seventh 
Circuit’s test fails to account for other identities that may not fit cleanly within a 
minority category, thus potentially privileging the rights of certain students over 
others. In his article, Post-Tinker, Raymond George Wright posits that Harper 
demonstrates the potential for broadly expanding the “rights of others” prong of 
the Tinker test,77 noting, “What is emotionally central to students’ identities may 
vary broadly. And whether purely numerical minority status, locally or more broadly, 
should entirely exhaust the logic of the court’s opinion in Harper is an unresolved 
further issue.”78 These unanswered questions and the circuit split over how schools 
can justify a ban on speech based on the minority status of the listeners provide 
schools unclear guidance on how to balance the heckler’s veto doctrine, which 
would require allowing potentially offensive speakers to speak, against the rights of 
minority students who might find themselves the targets of the speaker’s derogatory 
remarks. 
B. Tinker Test Prong Two: Substantial Disruption 
In yet another case upholding a restriction on students’ free speech, Dariano 
v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, the Ninth Circuit relied on Tinker’s “substantial 
disruption” prong to hold a school’s ban on wearing American flags to school  
 
74. Abby Marie Mollen, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial Student Speech, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1505 (2008). 
75. See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2011). 
76. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004). 
77. See Raymond George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1, 10 
(2014). 
78. Id. at 11. 
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on Cinco de Mayo constitutional.79 The court found the facts of Dariano 
distinguishable from those in Tinker, determining that there was significant 
evidence of “nascent and escalating violence” at the school.80 Specifically, the 
school officials’ prediction of violence was based on the context of ongoing racial 
tension and gang violence at the school, in addition to an almost-violent dispute 
over the display of an American flag during Cinco de Mayo the year before.81 
Notably, the court acknowledged concerns about the heckler’s veto because the 
school was restricting speech based on the reactions to the speech. However, the 
court nonetheless declined to apply the doctrine and instead relied on Tinker’s 
“substantial disruption” test: “Where speech ‘for any reason . . . materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder . . .’ school officials may limit the 
speech.”82 It reasoned that it would be overly burdensome to require schools to 
specifically identify the source of a violent threat before taking preemptive measures 
to ensure the safety of students.83 In fact, because of the special context of the 
school and the paramount interest in protecting a school’s learning environment 
and its students, the court essentially concluded that the heckler’s veto doctrine does 
not apply at all in the school context. It stated, “[T]he crucial distinction is the nature 
of the speech, not the source of it,” indicating that schools may suppress speech 
based on the reactions of hecklers.84 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has determined that 
Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test overrides the heckler’s veto doctrine. Because 
listeners can tactically plan violent or substantially disruptive protests in order to 
silence a speaker under this principle, the triumph of Tinker’s “substantial 
disruption” test effectively undermines any residual protection of students’ free 
speech rights afforded by the heckler’s veto doctrine. 
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Courts’ emphasis on Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test is understandable 
because schools undoubtedly have a strong interest in protecting the safety of 
students. “[B]ecause school attendance is compelled, students are not able to 
remove themselves, or be as easily removed, from the situation,” and, therefore, 
“the duty to protect [students] from harm is arguably heightened in this 
environment.”85 Nevertheless, although schools may be uniquely vulnerable to 
disruption by speakers’ speech, schools are also uniquely equipped to manage 
different points of view in pursuit of the education of the future citizenry. The 
following sections discuss the ideal solution to combating the diminishing 
 
79. See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 779 (9th Cir. 2014). 
80. Id. at 776. 
81. See id. at 777. 
82. Id. at 778. 
83. See id. 
84. Id. 
85. Case Note, Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014), 
Cert. Denied, 2015 WL 1400871, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2066, 2072 (2015). 
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protections of Tinker, the factors that schools and courts should be careful to 
consider in moving forward in order to adequately protect students’ free speech 
rights, and the possibilities of one pragmatic solution. 
A. The Ideal 
In an ideal world, a solution to the problem of balancing students’ rights is to 
require schools to hold a large assembly to talk through issues whenever there is a 
dispute over a speaker’s expression. This would be in line with the Court’s assertion 
in Tinker that as U.S. citizens, we must take the risk of disturbance in order to protect 
the right to freedom of expression because “our history says that it is this sort of 
hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our national 
strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in 
this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.”86 In fact, this has been a 
firmly held notion even before Tinker. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, where the Supreme Court found it an unconstitutional violation of First 
Amendment rights to compel unwilling students to salute the American flag,87 the 
Court stated, “[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. 
That would be a mere shadow of freedom.”88 Therefore, requiring an open forum 
in school to allow students to express their different views and opinions and 
respectfully respond to those of others would truly adhere to the principles 
espoused in Tinker by upholding schools as the “market place of ideas,” 
emphasizing the importance of open discussion, and protecting the free speech 
rights of students to express different opinions and views, even when such views 
may be controversial. 
B. Balancing the Rights of Others 
However, requiring a student assembly for every free speech dispute is likely 
unrealistic considering time and cost constraints. In formulating a more pragmatic 
solution, courts should take into account the fact that both the “substantial 
disruption” prong and the rights of other students prong of the Tinker test fail to 
consider the rights of a third group of students—third-party students who may, at 
least initially, have no particular feelings about the speaker. The Supreme Court has 
recognized the right to hear, or the “right to receive information and ideas,” as a 
constitutional right.89 For example, in Thomas v. Collins, the Court held that a state 
law requiring organizers to register before soliciting union membership was 
unconstitutional because it impermissibly restricted not only a labor organizer’s 
right to speak, but also the “rights of the workers to hear what he had to say.”90 The 
 
86. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969). 
87. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
88. Id. 
89. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
90. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945). 
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Supreme Court has even stated that the right to receive information and ideas is 
“‘nowhere more vital’ than in our schools and universities.”91 In Sheck v. Baileyville 
School Committee, the district court explained the importance of this right in schools, 
stating, “The robust traditions of public education in our constitutional 
jurisprudence contradict assertions that the Bill of Rights constrains the 
abridgement of free expression for the exclusive benefit of the speaker.”92 Although 
the court was deciding the constitutionality of a ban on a library book in Sheck, the 
court nevertheless cited the Tinker principles to support the protection of students’ 
right to hear: “Public schools are major marketplaces of ideas, and First 
Amendment rights must be accorded all ‘persons’ in the market for ideas.”93 
Therefore, courts should be cautious of minimizing concerns about the heckler’s 
veto, because by disregarding the doctrine, courts allow hecklers to abridge not only 
the speaker’s free speech rights, but also third-party students’ right to hear. 
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of appropriately balancing 
the rights of all three groups—the speaker, the protesting listeners, and the 
bystanders—in Martin v. City of Struthers, where it decided the constitutionality of a 
city ordinance prohibiting people from engaging in door-to-door distribution of 
literature.94 The Court stated: 
We are faced in the instant case with the necessity of weighing the 
conflicting interests of the [speaker] in the civil rights she claims, as well as 
the right of the individual householder to determine whether he is willing 
to receive her message, against the interest of the community which by this 
ordinance offers to protect the interests of all of its citizens, whether 
particular citizens want that protection or not.95 
The Court noted that it was particularly important that it carefully examine the 
effect and purpose of the ordinance because the ordinance assumes the judgment 
of the individual householder as the judgment of the community, and criminally 
punishes a speaker for distributing literature to householders even if the recipients 
may be welcome to receiving the literature.96 This consideration offers a way to 
balance students’ rights in public schools. Thus far, there has not been enough 
attention paid to the rights of third-party students, who, like the individual 
householder discussed in Martin, may welcome the speaker’s speech, or at least be 
open to hearing the speech. Courts have always given great deference to schools to 
decide what speech students may hear.97 Therefore, schools, instead of hecklers, 
should be the ones to make this decision. Because school officials should aspire to 
 
91. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 
487 (1960)). 
92. Sheck v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 686–87 (D. Me. 1982). 
93. Id. 
94. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 141–42 (1943). 
95. Id. at 143. 
96. See id. at 143–44. 
97. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
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preserve the classroom as the “marketplace of ideas,”98 consistent with the Tinker 
principles, such a decision should be made with the goal of protecting students’ 
right to speak and to hear. 
C. The Pragmatic Solution 
Although schools should strive for the ideal assembly solution, perhaps a more 
pragmatic solution is to determine whether the protesting listeners are genuinely 
aggrieved, as the Ninth Circuit has attempted to do by looking at the identity of the 
“hecklers.”99 This is an important consideration because if courts uphold school 
bans silencing the speaker without determining whether the substantial disruption 
caused by the listeners is genuine or, instead, for the sole purpose of silencing the 
speaker, they impermissibly value the free speech rights of the listeners over those 
of the speaker. By being required to assess whether listeners are genuinely aggrieved 
before imposing a ban on student expression, a school would only be able to silence 
the speaker if it could cite to evidence demonstrating the harmful effects of the 
speech on the listener based on the fact that the student belongs to a group that has 
been historically oppressed. Adopting a reasonableness standard, like that implied 
in Zamecnik,100 would enable schools to protect the rights of other students, or the 
listeners, without improperly restricting the First Amendment rights of speakers and 
third-party students. As for the “substantial disruption” prong, if a school could not 
demonstrate that the listeners were genuinely aggrieved students, the school would 
not be able to ban the speech unless it could cite to specific examples of how the 
speech substantially interfered with the students’ ability to learn. Although this is 
not a perfect solution, it is perhaps the solution schools must settle for in order to 
properly preserve the Tinker principles. 
CONCLUSION 
Finding the right balance between ensuring schools are able to advance their 
educational goals and protecting the First Amendment rights of students is 
undoubtedly a great challenge. Tinker, the paragon of student free speech rights, 
attempted to formulate a way to achieve an appropriate balance between these 
interests. However, subsequent decisions have used both the “substantial 
disruption” prong and the “rights of other students” prong of the Tinker test to 
create exceptions that significantly diminish First Amendment protections for 
students. Furthermore, because at the time the Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Tinker, it did not have the opportunity to consider the possibility that hecklers could 
be staging substantial disruption just to silence the speaker, the decision left speakers 
vulnerable to attack. This note identifies the ideal solution to returning to the 
 
98. Id. at 512. 
99. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006). 
100. See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 
Final to Printer_Liu (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2019  9:34 AM 
846 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:829 
original principles of Tinker, but proposes a more pragmatic solution that takes into 
account an aspect of the free speech analysis that has received little attention: the 
rights of bystanders and how a decision to silence a speaker based on the demands 
of potential hecklers must be carefully considered because of its effect on these 
bystanders, who have a constitutional right to listen to speech. This Note argues 
that in the context of K-12 public schools, school officials should be the ones to 
decide what students can hear instead of allowing this determination to be made by 
hecklers. In order to preserve schools as marketplaces of ideas, as championed by 
Tinker, officials should aim to maximize First Amendment protections for students. 
With this goal in mind, schools should focus on the identity of the potential hecklers 
and use an objective test to determine whether the potential hecklers are actually 
genuinely aggrieved listeners before the school decides to silence the speaker. 
 
